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INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, developed and developing states alike have
constructed an increasingly liberal international investment regime'
through conclusion of an enormous network of bilateral investment trea-
ties (BITs).2 As of early 1997, more than 1300 BITs had been signed
* Dean and Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law
School (1979); B.A., University of Louisville (1975).
1. A liberal international investment regime is one in which States permit the market to
determine allocations of capital, ensure the proper functioning of the market, and provide legal
protection for investment against wrongful injury by public or private agents. I have argued
elsewhere that the existing legal regime is effective principally at providing protection for in-
vestment. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty
(forthcoming).
2. The typical BIT guarantees that covered investment will receive national and most fa-
vored nation treatment, prohibits exchange controls and uncompensated expropriation, and
obligates host states to submit investment disputes with private investors and treaty disputes
with the home state to binding, third-party arbitration. Regarding the BITs, see generally
RUDOLP DOLZER AND MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (1995);
KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY AND PRACTICE
(1992); Adeoye Akinsanya, International Protection of Direct Foreign Investment in the Third
World, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 58 (1987); Eileen Denza & Shelagh Brooks, Investment Protec-
tion Treaties: United Kingdom Experience, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 908 (1987); Pamela B.
Gann, The U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, 21 STAN. J. INT'L L. 373 (1985); Mo-
hamed I. Khalil, Treatment of Foreign Investment in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 8 ICSID
REV.: FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 339 (1992); Palitha T.B. Kohona, Investment Protection
Agreements: An Australian Perspective, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 79 (April 1987); T. Modibo
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involving over 160 States.' Further, since 1995, the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development has been sponsoring negotiation of
a multilateral agreement on investment. Several multilateral agreements
protecting foreign investment already exist, although these are limited in
their applicability to certain regions or sectors of the economy.'
This consensus about the desirability of liberalization is a very recent
phenomenon. More than two-thirds of the 1300 BITs, for example, have
been concluded since 1990.6 By contrast, as little as two decades ago,
there were scarcely twenty countries in the world committed to liberal
investment principles.7
This article explores the events that have given rise to this sudden and
astonishing consensus. It argues that the consensus is not necessarily
permanent, but reflects the momentary confluence of several political and
economic trends. It concludes that, if the consensus is to be maintained,
then States must use this moment to ensure the success of liberalism,
rather than to seize temporary economic advantage. In essence, if a liberal
investment regime is to be effective,' then States must develop a sustain-
able liberalism.
Ocran, Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties. A Comparative Study, 8 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 401 (1987); Robert K. Paterson, Canadian Investment Promotion and Protection
Treaties, 29 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 373 (1991); Jeswald Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries,
24 INT'L L. 655 (1990); M. Sornarajah, State Responsibility and Bilateral Investment Treaties,
20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 79 (1986); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty
Program of the United States, 21 CORN. INT'L L.J. 201 (1988); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, U.S.
Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 621 (1993).
3. The UN Centre for Transnational Corporations counted 1306 BITs as of the end of
1996. For a listing of the treaties, see UNITED NATIONS CENTRE FOR TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS (UNCTC), BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID 1990S
(forthcoming). The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes separately com-
piled a list of more than 1100 treaties involving 155 countries through the end of 1996. See
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SEITLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (ICSID) INVESTMENT
TREATIES (1997).
4. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TOWARDS
MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT RULES (1996).
5. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Chapter Eleven, 32
I.L.M. 605, 639 (1993); The Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, Part II, 34 I.L.M. 360, 385
(1995).
6. See UNCTC, supra note 3.
7. In the early 1970s, several resolutions intended to challenge liberal investment princi-
ples were introduced in the United Nations General Assembly. The most important of these
resolutions was opposed by only six States and the most controversial provision of that resolu-
tion, one that was the very antithesis of a liberal international investment regime, was opposed
by only sixteen States. See infra text accompanying notes 81-88.
8. The effectiveness of a liberal investment regime in particular is directly linked to its
longevity. Liberalism requires protection for investment, which by its nature is long term, and
requires deference to the market, which is self-correcting only over the long term. See JOHN
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I. THE TRADITIONAL DIVISION
A. Theories of Political Economy
In the modem era, three different theories concerning the proper rela-
tionship between the State and the market9 have competed for the
allegiance of the international community. The emergence of the modem
nation state in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe was accompa-
nied by the development of the theory of mercantilism, which held among
its tenets that economic activity should serve the political policy of the
State. 0 Mercantilism advocated extensive state regulation of economic
activity in furtherance of the national interest." Mercantilists equated na-
tional wealth with the quantity of gold held by the State and sought to
restrict imports while increasing exports in order to increase the gold sup-
ply.'2 In the period of its ascendancy, the sixteenth through the eighteenth
centuries, mercantilism dominated European political economy. 3
To the extent that a State needed resources not available in its terri-
tory, mercantilism held that these resources should be acquired from
colonial possessions. At the same time, colonial possessions would pro-
duce a market for the State's exports. Thus, mercantilism and colonialism
were mutually reinforcing.1
4
Mercantilism was challenged in the eighteenth century by the liberal
economic theory of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Liberals argued that
national wealth was best measured by the productivity of the people, not
the amount of gold in the treasury, and that productivity was best achieved
by an unregulated market.'5 Liberals thus opposed restrictions on
RAPLEY, UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE THIRD WORLD 8
(1996).
9. See generally GEORGE T. CRANE AND ABLA AMAWI, THE THEORETICAL EVOLUTION
OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (1997); ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1987); TORBJORN L. KNUTSEN, A HISTORY OF INTER-
NATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 237-39 (1992); INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (C. Roe
Goddard et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter Goddard et al.]; INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY:
PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL POWER AND WEALTH (Jeffry A. Frieden & David A. Lake eds., 3d
ed. 1995) [hereinafter Frieden & Lake]; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY (Paul R. Viotti &
Mark V. Kauppi eds., 2d ed. 1993).
10. See CRANE & AMAWI, supra note 9, at 5; Frieden & Lake, supra note 9, at 69; GILPIN,
supra note 9, at 31-32.
11. See DOMINICK SALVATORE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 27-28 (5th ed. 1995);
CRANE & AMAWI, supra note 9, at 5.
12. See SALVATORE, supra note 11, at 26-28.
13. See David A. Lake, British and American Hegemony Compared. Lessons for the Cur-
rent Era of Decline, in Frieden & Lake, supra note 9, at 121.
14. See generally RONDO CAMERON, A CONCISE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE WORLD
130-62 (3d ed. 1997); Lake, supra note 13, at 122.
15. See CRANE & AMAWi, supra note 9, at 6-7, 55-58; Jeffry A. Frieden & David A.
Lake, International Politics and International Economics, in Goddard et al., supra note 9, at 25.
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international trade. By the early nineteenth century, liberalism had been
embraced by Great Britain, the dominant economic power in the world,
triggering a general movement toward free trade throughout Europe in the
mid-nineteenth century.1
6
Political economy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was not
greatly concerned with international investment. The difficulties of travel
and communication over large distances deterred the establishment of
foreign direct investment.1 7 The principal exception involved the Dutch,
who made direct investments in various commercial projects throughout
Europe as early as the seventeenth century,18 although such investments
tended to be of relatively short duration.'9 More typically, transfrontier
investment flows prior to the mid-nineteenth century took the form of
lending by European investors to borrowers in other European states.'
Nineteenth century industrialization, however, both produced large
capital surpluses that were available for investment and entailed the de-
velopment of large manufacturing and transportation enterprises that
required major capital investments." The early nineteenth century also
saw the beginning of the widespread use of the corporate form of business
organization22 and the emergence of securities markets. These develop-
ments provided the economic and legal conditions for a substantial
increase in foreign direct as well as portfolio investment. British foreign
investment, for example, grew from $500 million in 1825 to $12.1 billion
in 1900." French foreign investment grew from $100 million in 1825 to
$5.2 billion in 1900.26
Most foreign investment throughout the nineteenth century was port-
folio investment, and the largest share of this was investment made by
English banks in Europe and North America. As late as 1914, 43 percent
of all foreign investment was British investment. Europe and North
16. See Charles P. Kindleberger, The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe, in Frieden &
Lake, supra note 9, at 73-88; Stephen D, Krasner, State Power and the Structure of Interna-
tional Trade, in Frieden & Lake, supra note 9, at 25, 28, 30-31; CAMERON, supra note 14, at
296-98.
17. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF WESTERN EUROPE 258
(2d ed. 1993).
18. See id. at 209.
19. See id. at 258.
20. See id. at 208-24.
21. See CAMERON, supra note 14, at 308.
22. See id. at 213-14.
23. See id. at 308.
24. Direct investment is distinguished from portfolio investment in that a direct investor
seeks to control the investment, while the portfolio investor seeks only a return on capital.
25. See KINDLEBERGER, supra note 17, at 220.
26. Id.
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America received 27 percent and 24 percent of all foreign investment,
respectively."
Coincident with this explosion in foreign investment came the emer-
gence of Marxist economics, which placed much importance on the flow
of international investment. Marxist theory contended that the accumula-
tion of large quantities of capital in industrialized states would lead to an
oversupply and thus reduce the return earned by investors.2 In order to
increase their returns, capitalists would invest in nonindustrialized states,
where the relative scarcity of capital would ensure a greater return on in-
vestment.29 The result would be the development of a capitalist economy
in these developing states, a necessary step on the way to the eventual
establishment of socialism.
Although early Marxism focused on the positive effects of transfron-
tier investment flows on developing states in bringing feudalism to an end
and promoting economic development, later Marxist theorists had a dif-
ferent perspective 0 More recent Marxist theorists have focused on the
potential adverse effects of foreign investment on developing states, ar-
guing that foreign investment locks developing states into a pattern of
underdevelopment3e ' and dependency.32
Marxist theory found practical application in the Soviet Union after
1917 and in China, Eastern Europe and other States after World War II.
These States abolished private property and the market, and created
planned economies in which all aspects of economic activity were regu-
lated by the State.33
27. See CAMERON, supra note 14, at 311.
28. See GILPIN, supra note 9, at 36-37.
29. See CAMERON, supra note 14, at 321; Frieden & Lake, supra note 15, at 29-30; CRANE
& AMAWI, supra note 9, at 10, 83-85.
30. See, e.g., CRANE & AMAWI, supra note 9, at 85; GILPIN, supra note 9, at 38-40, 270-
73 (discussing how the development of capitalism between 1870 and 1914 affected Lenin's
view of Marxism); Rhys Jenkins, Theoretical Perspectives on the Transnational Corporation, in
Goddard et al., supra note 9, at 439, 450-52.
31. See SUBRATA GHATAK, INTRODUCTION TO DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 65 (3d. ed.
1995); E. WAYNE NAFZIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 106-07 (3d ed.
1997); MICHAEL P. TODARO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 81-82 (5th ed. 1994); Jenkins, supra
note 30, at 448-50.
32. See NAFZIGER, supra note 31, at 106-08; RAPLEY, supra note 8, at 18-20. See gener-
ally Theotonio dos Santos, The Structure of Dependence, in Goddard et al., supra note 9, at 165;
Immanuel Wallerstein, Dependence in an Inter-Dependent World, in Goddard et al., supra note
9, at 176. Earlier important statements of dependency theory included CELSO FURTADO,
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA: A SURVEY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
CUBAN REVOLUTION (Suzette Macedo trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1970), and ANDRE
GINDER FRANK, LATIN AMERICAN: UNDER DEVELOPMENT OR REVOLUTION (1969).
33. See MICHAEL BARRATr BROWN, MODELS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 193-267
(Penguin Books 2d ed. 1995); RAPLEY, supra note 8, at 44.
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Liberalism also was challenged in the nineteenth century by the
emergence of economic nationalism, a successor to mercantile theory.
Economic nationalism stressed the primacy of raison d'etat and favored
state regulation of the economy, including international trade, in the name
of the national interest. Economic nationalism was compatible with the
wave of nationalist fervor that swept through Europe in the latter half of
the nineteenth century, and in fact European trade policy became more
protectionist after the 1870s."
Protectionism peaked during the interwar period with successive
rounds of retaliatory tariff increases and currency devaluations intended to
curtail imports and to improve each State's economic position at the ex-
penses of other States.36 One consequence of these protectionist policies
was to reduce world trade sharply, which in turn contracted demand, de-
creased production, raised unemployment and worsened the Great
Depression of the 1930s. 7
B. Pre-War International Investment Policy
The growth in foreign investment during the nineteenth century led
inevitably to investment disputes. Because so much foreign investment in
the nineteenth century was portfolio investment, many of the earliest in-
vestment disputes involved the repudiation of debts, particularly debts
owed by developing states to European investors. 8 Economic nationalist
states, who linked the protection of their citizens' property with the na-
tional interest, proved all too willing to use military force to collect
unpaid private loans.39 Consistent with its own nationalist policy, the
United States announced the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,
which reserved to the United States the exclusive prerogative to use mili-
tary force to collect private debts in the Americas. 40 Thus, the most salient
feature of international investment policy in the period just prior to World
34. See CAMERON, supra note 14, at 222; PETER B. KENEN, THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMY 225 (3d ed. 1994).
35. See CAMERON, supra note 14, at 301-03; Stephen D. Krasner, State Power and the
Structure of International Trade, in Frieden & Lake, supra note 9, at 28-32. There nevertheless
were significant efforts at trade liberalization through bilateral agreements, particularly by
France. See BERNARD HOEKMAN AND MICHAEL KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 2 (1995).
36. See CAMERON, supra note 14, at 351; HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 35, at 2-3;
KENEN, supra note 34, at 227.
37. See CAMERON, supra note 14, at 351-58.
38. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 7 (1994).
39. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Reassessing the HickenlooperAmendnent, 29 VA. J. INT'L
L. 115, 119 (1988).
40. See id.
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War I was the claim by economic nationalist capital exporting states of
the right to use military force to protect foreign investment.'
A second category of investment disputes involved damage to or con-
fiscation of foreign direct investment. The security of property in foreign
territory had been a longstanding concern of governments. Until the de-
velopment of large scale foreign direct investment in the mid-nineteenth
century, however, the concern had focused principally on the protection of
merchandise for trade and the security of property during time of war.42
As foreign investment increased in quantity, the seizure of foreign in-
vestment became a more common phenomenon. 3 Capital exporting states
demanded compensation for the loss of their investments and, in a num-
ber of cases where these demands were submitted to international
arbitration or adjudication, won awards or judgments holding that host
states have a duty to pay compensation for the expropriation of foreign
property."
In reaching these decisions, international tribunals were not writing
on an entirely clean slate. Since the Middle Ages, there had been in inter-
national law a doctrine that a State had the right to exercise diplomatic
protection of its aliens abroad, that is, to seek redress for injuries to its
citizens caused by the action of foreign states.5 Over time, this principle
had been applied to protect foreign investment,46 a development reflected
in the international judicial and arbitral decisions.
At the same time the right of diplomatic protection was being applied
to foreign investment, the principle itself was under attack. In the late
nineteenth century, Carlos Calvo, an Argentine jurist, propounded the
Calvo Doctrine, which asserted that foreign nationals were not entitled to
treatment in the host state more favorable than that received by host state
41. See Edward M. Borchard, Limitations on Coercive Protection, 21 AM. J. INT'L L. 303
(1927); Luis M. Drago, State Loans in Their Relation to International Policy, 1 AM. J. INT'L L.
692 (1907).
42. See VANDEVELDE 1992, supra note 2, at 16.
43. Brownlie notes that, in the century after 1840, some sixty claims commissions were
established to deal with disputes arising from injuries to the interests of aliens. IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 521 (4th ed. 1990).
44. See Case Concerning the Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
13, at 63--64 (Sept. 13); Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger.
v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, at 81-82 (May 25); Lena Goldfields, Ltd. (1930)
(unpublished opinion), discussed in 36 CORNELL L.Q. 42 (1950); Shufeldt Claim (U.S. v.
Guat.), 2 REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1080 (1930); Norwegian Shipowners Claims (Nor. v. U.S.),
1 REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 308 (1922); Affaire des Navires Cape Horn Pigeon, James Ham-
ilton Lewis, C.H. White et Kate and Anna (U.S. v. Russ.), 9 REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 51, 63-
66(1902).
45. See BROWNLIE, supra note 43, at 521.
46. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 38, at 8-9.
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nationals. 7 The Calvo Doctrine had a substantive and a procedural dimen-
sion. The substantive dimension rejected the idea that special international
law norms apply to the treatment of foreign nationals by a host state. 8
The procedural dimension rejected the right of home states to exercise
diplomatic protection of their nationals abroad.49
The Calvo Doctrine was an expression of the economic nationalist
theory that was of growing importance in international political economy
in the late nineteenth century. Special protection for foreign nationals un-
der international law was inconsistent with the prerogative of the host
state to subordinate economic activity to the national interest. The Calvo
Doctrine was quickly embraced throughout Latin America. Despite its
consistency with economic nationalism, the Calvo Doctrine won little
support in Europe, however." Rather, the European states continued to
perceive their interests as best served by a doctrine that protected their
nationals and property abroad.52
The disagreement between the capital exporting states and the Calvo
states became explicit in the famous exchange of notes between U.S. Sec-
retary of State Cordell Hull and the Mexican Foreign Minister in 1938
with respect to Mexico's nationalization of agrarian and oil property
owned by U.S. nationals.53 On the strength of the arbitral and judicial de-
cisions concerning the right to compensation," Secretary Hull asserted in
his note that host states have a duty under international law to pay
"prompt, adequate and effective" compensation for expropriated foreign
investment.5 Consistent with the Calvo Doctrine, the Mexican minister
contended that Mexico was obligated to compensate foreign investors
only to the extent required by its own law,56 since giving preference to
foreigners would violate the principle of equality.1
7
A second challenge to the principle of diplomatic protection of for-
eign investment came from the socialist states that rejected the concept of
private property entirely. Following its seizure of power in 1917, the Bol-
shevik government in the Soviet Union took the position that an alien
47. See DONALD R. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE: A PROBLEM OF INTER-AMERICAN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY 17-20 (1955).
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 21.
51. See id. at 20.
52. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 38, at 9-10.
53. The exchange of notes may be found at GREEN H. HACKWORTH, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, PUB. No. 1708, 3 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 655-61 (1942).
54. See cases and arbitral decisions cited in supra note 44.
55. See HACKWORTH, supra note 53, at 658-59.
56. See id. at 658.
57. See id. at 659.
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who acquires property in another state does so subject to the national laws
of the host state and thus international law imposes no requirement of
compensation on a host state for the expropriation of foreign investment."
As this suggests, by the mid-twentieth century, there were three views
concerning the protection of foreign investment against expropriation.
The developed states, consistent with either a liberal investment policy or
an economic nationalist policy favorable to them, argued that international
law required the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensa-
tion. The Calvo states, consistent with their own economic nationalist
views, contended that international law required only national treatment.
The socialist states, avowing Marxist theory, denied that international law
protected foreign investment.
C. Post-War Investment Policy
The end of the Second World War brought four important changes
that would affect the political economy of international investment. First,
there emerged a consensus that much of the economic havoc of the inter-
war period had been aggravated by economic nationalist policies in the
arena of international trade. 9 As the war drew to a close, the victorious
allies resolved to create a liberal international economic order that would
prevent the recurrence of the protectionist wars that preceded the military
conflictW In 1947, twenty-three States concluded the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1 intended as a temporary measure to begin
the process of building a liberal regime for international trade. A second,
more elaborate treaty, the Havana Charter, was expected to create a liberal
regime for both trade and investment, but never entered into force because
the United States withdrew its support.62 Thus, the GA'IT signalled the
beginning of a liberal international economic regime, although it did not
involve investment.
Second, the quantity of foreign direct investment exploded, with the
United States continuing in the role it had assumed in the 1920s as the
leading source of foreign direct investment.63 Improved communication
58. See S. FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (1953); ALAN C.
SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 774 (1991).
59. See generally HOECKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 35, at 2-3.
60. See CAMERON, supra note 14, at 370-71.
61. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 20, 1947, 61 Stat. 3689, 55 U.N.T.S.
188.
62. See HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 35, at 12-13.
63. See DEAN M. HANINK, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY: A GEOGRAPHICAL PER-
SPECTIVE 223-24 (1994). In the 1950s, two-thirds of foreign investment came from the United
States. See BO SODERSTEN & GEOFFREY REED, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 468 (3d ed.
1994).
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and transportation made it possible to control foreign investment around
the world and thus by the 1950s direct investment had emerged as the
dominant form of international investment flow." Particularly in the
1950s and 1960s, economic nationalist developing states sought foreign
direct investment that would contribute to the development of industries
to manufacture goods to displace imports, a strategy known as import
substitution industrialization.65 The importance of capital movements has
continued to grow, with the result that by the mid-1990s the quantity of
capital movements was quintuple the quantity of international trade.66
Third, as foreign direct investment increased in quantity with an at-
tendant increase in risk to capital exporting states, an international
investment regime began to emerge. Unlike the regime for international
trade, however, the regime for international investment was constructed of
a network of bilateral treaties. Two different factors may have influenced
the emergence of international investment agreements in the post-war era.
First, the United Nations Charter now prohibited the use of force to pro-
tect property abroad.67 Thus, capital exporting states began to search for
alternatives to gunboat diplomacy, principally economic sanctions and
international legal process." The United States was the most visible pro-
ponent of economic sanctions, enacting legislation such as the
Hickenlooper Amendment that imposed economic sanctions on host
states that expropriated U.S. property without payment of prompt, ade-
quate and effective compensation.69 Economic sanctions, however, were
rarely applied and they largely failed.0 Second, liberal economic theory
assumes the protection of property through an autonomous legal system.1
Thus, a liberal international investment regime necessarily would require
a body of international investment law.
The United States took the lead in developing such a regime. Imme-
diately following the war, the United States began to negotiate a series of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) treaties, a major purpose of
64. See HANINK, supra note 63, at 224; SODERSTEN & REED, supra note 63, at 462.
65. See RAPELY, supra note 8, at 22-25.
66. See HANINK, supra note 63, at 140.
67. Article 2(4) prohibits the "threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. Article 51 creates an exception for measures
taken in the exercise of the right of self-defense. Id. art. 51. See generally ANTHONY CLARK
AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE U.N.
CHARTER PARADIGM (1993).
68. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 38, at 55-56.
69. See Vandevelde, supra note 39, at 125-44.
70. See id. at 144-48, 156-60,166-67.
71. See generally Tamar Frankel, Essay, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of
Contract and Property Law, 73 B.U. L. REV. 389 (1993); Paul H. Rubin, Growing a Legal
System in the Post-Communist Economies, 27 CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 1 (1994).
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which was to protect U.S. investment abroad.7 ' As Europe recovered from
the war and began to invest abroad, the European states similarly began to
negotiate treaties to protect foreign investment. Germany negotiated the
first bilateral investment treaty in 1959," with several other European
states following suit in the 1960s. 4
Fourth, at the very moment when liberal economic theory, with its
emphasis on the rule of law in international economic relations, was being
embraced by the dominant world powers, there was a dramatic increase in
the number of countries that questioned the basic premises of liberalism.
The socialist countries, which soon after the war included the Soviet
Union, China, and Central and Eastern Europe, rejected the concept of
private property and the free market entirely and thus could not participate
in a liberal economic regime.7 ' The end of colonialism yielded a large
number of newly independent states in Africa and Asia that were fiercely
nationalistic,76 skeptical of the liberal economic order being advocated by
the former colonial powers of Europe, and resistant to being bound by an
international legal regime that had been created without their
involvement. 77 Many newly independent states were drawn to Marxist
economics, with its emphasis on the role of foreign investment in
promoting underdevelopment, and to economic nationalism, which
seemed highly congenial to the task of nation building that lay before
72. For a discussion of the FCNs, see HENRY C. HAWKINS, COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND
AGREEMENTS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (1951); ROBERT REUBERT WILSON, THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW STANDARD IN TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES (1953); ROBERT REUBERT
WILSON, UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1960); Herman
Walker, Jr., Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805
(1958); Herman Walker, Jr., Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties, 50
AM. J. INT'L L. 373 (1956); Herman Walker, Jr., Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection
of Foreign Investment: Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1956); Robert R.
Wilson, A Decade of New Commercial Treaties, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 927 (1956); Robert R. Wil-
son, Postwar Commercial Treaties of the United States, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 262 (1949); Robert
R. Wilson, Property-Protection Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties, 45 AM. J.
INT'L L. 83 (1951).
73. The first BIT was that between Germany and Pakistan, which was signed November
25, 1959 and entered into force on April 28, 1962. The first BIT to enter into force was that
between Germany and the Dominican Republic, signed December 16, 1959 and entered into
force June 3, 1960. See DOLZER .& STEVENS, supra note 2, at 267 (chronological list of BITs).
74. Among the European states that signed their first BIT in the 1960s are Switzerland
(1961), the Netherlands (1963), the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (1964), Italy
(1964), Sweden (1965), Norway (1966) and Denmark (1968). See id. at 267-69.
75. See RAPLY, supra note 8, at 44-45.
76. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 38, at 12.
77. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 36-39 (3d ed. 1991); R.P. Anand,
ATTITUDE OF THE AFRO-ASIAN STATES TOWARDS CERTAIN PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 15 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 55 (1966).
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them." Because both Marxist economics and economic nationalism
supported extensive state regulation of economic activity and a
redistribution of wealth from developed to developing states, the two
theories were often indistinguishable in practice. 9 Some states adopted
policies that blended the two, as in the case of African socialism.0
By the late 1960s, the group of developed states, the so-called first
world, which sought to create a liberal international economic regime,
constituted only a small minority of states.8' The socialist states of the
second world and the developing states of the third world became
increasingly vocal in calling for a restructuring of the international
economic order along Marxist or nationalist lines in order to promote
their political influence and their economic development. The opposition
to a liberal international investment regime was particularly evident in the
United Nations General Assembly, where the developed states were at
their greatest numerical disadvantage. On May 1, 1974, the General
Assembly adopted without vote Resolution 3201, containing a
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order
(NIEO).82 The Declaration stated that the international economic order
should be founded on principles that included "[f]ull permanent
sovereignty of every state over its natural resources and all economic
activities." 3 Such sovereignty included "the right to nationalization or
transfer of ownership to its nationals." The Declaration did not specify
whether compensation must be paid or the amount of any such
compensation.
The issue of compensation was addressed by the General Assembly a
few months later, on December 12, 1974, when it adopted the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States by a vote of 120-6, with ten
abstentions.85 Article 2.2(c), which was adopted separately. by a vote of
78. Political independence and economic development were national priorities of the
newly independent states. See RAPLEY, supra note 8, at 12.
79. See CRANE & AMAWI, supra note 9, at 21; GILPIN, supra note 9, at 282-88.
80. See BROWN, supra note 33, at 269-85; RAPLEY, supra note 8, at 31-32.
81. See THOMAS R. VAN DERVORT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION: AN
INTRODUCTION 52-55 (1998).
82. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res.
3201(S-VI), U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., 229th mtg., Agenda Item 7, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3201(S-VI) (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974).
83. Id. para. 4(e).
84. Id.
85. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess., 2315th mtg., Agenda Item 48, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281(XXIX) (1975)
[hereinafter Resolution 3281], reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975). The six states that voted in
opposition were Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the United
Kingdom and the United States. The ten states that abstained were Austria, Canada, France,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain. See id. at 265.
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104-16, with six abstentions,86 stated that each state has the right "[t]o
nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in
which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State
adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and
regulations and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent." 7 The
Charter thus stated not that compensation must be paid, but only that it
should be paid, and that the relevant standard for compensation should be
based on the national law of the host state, not international law."
The attack on liberal economic principles was not merely rhetorical.
Although some developing states had sought to attract foreign investment
in the first decades of the post war period, 9 by the 1970s, many develop-
ing states were more skeptical about the value of foreign investment and,
in the name of Marxism or nationalism or both, expropriated major for-
eign investments in-their territories. °
At the end of the 1970s, the world remained sharply divided in its
view of international investment policy, particularly the issue of compen-
sation for expropriation. 9' The developed states asserted that expropriation
required payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. The
socialist states Contended that no compensation was required, although
they frequently did agree to pay compensation in settlement of claims by
expropriated foreign investors.92 The developing states also rejected the
prompt, adequate and effective standard, generally taking the position that
the calculation of compensation should depend upon a variety of factors,
86. The sixteen negative votes were cast by Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal
Republic of Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. The six abstentions were by Austra-
lia, Barbados, Finland, Israel, New Zealand and Portugal. See id. at 264.
87. Resolution 3281, supra note 85, art. 2, para. 2(c), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. at 255.
88. See generally Charles N. Brower & John B. Tepe, Jr., The Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States: A Reflection or Rejection of International Law? 9 INT'L LAw. 295 (1975);
Bums H. Weston, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation of
Foreign Owned Wealth, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 437 (1981).
89. See supra text accompanying note 65.
90. See VANDEVELDE 1992, supra note 2, at 20. See also David A. Gantz, The Maricona
Settlement: New Forms of Negotiation and Compensation for Nationalized Property, 71 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 474 n.2 (1977); William Rogers, Of Missionaries, Fanatics and Lawyers: Same
Thoughts on Investment Disputes in the Americas, 72 AM. J. INT'L. L. 1 (1978); United Nations
Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), Work on the Formation of the United Nations
Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. EIC.10/1985/S/2, reprinted in
Louis HENKIN Er AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 686 (3d ed. 1993).
91. See UNCTC, supra note 90, at 684-86.
92. See id. at 685-86. On lump sum agreements, see RICHARD B. LILLICH & BURNS H.
WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM AGREEMENT (1975);
Richard B. Lillich & Burns H Weston, Lump Sum Agreements: Their Continuing Contribution
to the Law of International Claims, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 69 (1988).
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such as the return that the investor already had received prior to the ex-
propriation and the content of local law on the subject.93
With the amount of foreign direct investment in developing states
continuing to grow and the support for the prompt, adequate and effective
standard as an element of customary international law continuing to
erode,"' the developed states placed increased emphasis on securing pro-
tection for their investment abroad through the negotiation of bilateral
investment treaties. Several developed states had begun negotiating BITs
in the 1960s,95 and the practice became more widespread in the 1970s,96 as
developed states sought ways to counter an increasingly hostile interna-
tional investment climate."
II. THE EMERGENCE OF CONSENSUS
No single event accounts for the sudden reversal in investment policy
and the emergence of the contemporary consensus. Ironically, the appar-
ent demise of economic nationalism with respect to capital movements in
the 1990s may have resulted from the very ascendancy of nationalism in
the 1970s, in much the same way that economic nationalism in interna-
tional trade was discredited after the Second World War by the effects of
economic nationalist competition prior to the war. In 1973, the year be-
fore the General Assembly reaffirmed the right of permanent sovereignty
over natural resources in the NIEO Declaration, the members of the Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) exercised their
sovereignty over their natural resources by quadrupling the price of oil on
the world market."
One consequence was that many developing states suddenly were
forced to borrow money to purchase oil and other imports.99 Another
93. This was essentially the position taken in Article 2, Paragraph 2(c) of the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States. Resolution 3281, supra note 85, art. 2, para. 2(c). See
also UNCTC, supra note 90, at 684-86.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 47-58, 74-90.
95. See supra note 74.
96. Developed states that signed their first BIT in the 1970s include France (1972), the
United Kingdom (1975), Austria (1976), and Japan (1977). See ICSID, supra note 3, at 3-6.
The United States started its BIT program in 1977, but did not sign its first one until 1982. See
VANDEVELDE 1992, supra note 2, at 29, 35.
97. The United States in particular saw BIT negotiations as a means of responding to the
attack on the principle of compensation for expropriation. See VANDEVELDE 1992, supra note
2, at 20-22.
98. See NAFZIGER, supra note 31, at 464. The proponents of the NIEO Declaration spe-
cifically applauded OPEC's action. See Ibrahim Fl. Shihata, Arab Oil Policies and the New
International Economic Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L. L. 261,271-75 (1976).
99. See TODARO, supra note 31, at 459-62.
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consequence was that the OPEC states rapidly acquired from the sale of
oil very large quantities of dollars that they deposited in banks around the
world.' °° The banks were only too willing to lend these dollars to
developing states,'0 ' with the result that in the early 1970s many
developing states began to accumulate substantial external debts. For
example, the external debt of all developing states grew from $68.4
billion in 1970 to $635.8 billion in 1980, an almost tenfold increase in
just ten years.' 2 Meanwhile, the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979
triggered a second oil shock that doubled energy prices, setting off the
most severe worldwide recession in five decades.' 3 The recession in turn
reduced demand for developing state exports, thereby curtailing the
ability of these states to earn foreign currency to service the debt incurred
during the 1970s.'04
A second crucial factor in creating the current consensus was the eco-
nomic policy of the Reagan administration, which combined deficit
spending with a restrictive monetary policy.' 5 The resulting surge in the
United States budget deficit converted the United States from the world's
largest creditor in the early 1980s to the world's largest debtor by the mid-
1980s.' °  The United States financed its budget deficits by selling bonds to
foreign investors. The United States thus was competing with developing
states for debt financing, with the result that developing states increas-
ingly found themselves unable to borrow additional funds from private
lenders to refinance their debts.'07 The restrictive monetary policy and
competition for capital pushed up interest rates and thereby heightened
the burden of the accumulated debt on developing states.'08 U.S. budget
deficits also impaired the economic recovery in Europe,'m which defeated
the efforts of developing states to bolster their exports to developed states
100. The OPEC surplus increased nearly tenfold in a single year, from $7 billion in 1973
to $68 billion in 1974 and reached $115 billion in 1980. See id
101. The amount of petrodollars lent to the third world between 1976 and 1982 totalled
more than $350 billion. See id.
102. See id. at 460.
103. See GHATAK, supra note 31, at 435.
104. See RAPLEY, supra note 8, at 37-38; Jahangier Amuzegar, Dealing with Debt, 68
FOREIGN POL'Y 140, 141-42 (1987); Samuel Britain, A Very Painfid World Adjustment, 61
FOREIGN AFF. 541, 541-48 (1982); Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, Latin American Debt, 61 FOREIGN
AFF. 344, 350-51 (1982).
105. See Jeffrey E. Garten, Gunboat Economics, 63 FOREIGN AFF. 538, 545 (1984).
106. The United States went from being the world's largest creditor in 1982 to its largest
debtor by 1985. See STEVEN HUSTED & MICHAEL MELVIN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 314
(3d ed. 1995). See generally Lester C. Thurow & Laura D'Andrea Tyson, The Economic Black
Hole, 67 FOREIGN POL'Y 3 (1987).
107. See Garten, supra note 105, at 546.
108. See GHATAK, supra note 31, at 435.
109. See Martin Feldstein, American Economic Policy and the World Economy, 63
FOREIGN AFF. 995 (1985).
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and earn foreign currency to pay off their external debt. Capital shortages
in developing states were exacerbated by massive capital flight,"0 as the
deteriorating economic situation in developing states prompted wealthy
nationals to invest their money abroad."'
These events converged in the early 1980s to trigger the third world
debt crisis. The crisis began in August 1982 when Mexico announced that
it could not make its payments on its $80 billion debt."' Banks that had
lent extensively to developing states suddenly were threatened with col-
lapse.'13 Ultimately, the collapse was averted by a combination of
refinancing with funds borrowed from the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and debt forgiveness under the Brady Plan in 1989
and the early 1990s."' One result, however, was that commercial banks
thereafter were far less willing to lend money to developing states."'
Under other circumstances, developing states might have replaced
commercial loans with loans from multilateral development agencies,
such as the World Bank. The early 1980s, however, coincided with a re-
duction in lending by international financial institutions, largely at the
behest of the Reagan administration." 6 In 1984, for example, the United
States insisted on a 40 percent reduction in lending by the International
Development Agency, the World Bank entity that lends to the poorest na-
tions. '7 Between 1980 and 1987, United States contributions to
multilateral development banks dropped from $2.3 billion annually to
$1.1 billion."8
Further, such loans as were available through the World Bank and
other public lenders were conditioned on the adoption by the loan recipi-
110. For example, it is estimated that capital flight accounted for all but $12 billion of
Mexico's $96 billion foreign debt in 1985. See TODARO, supra note 31,463-64.
111. Currencies in developing states became overvalued (partially as a result of falling ex-
ports). This in turn gave rise to fears that the currency would be devalued in the future, leading
to efforts to invest funds in more stable currencies abroad. See HUSTED & MELVIN, supra note
106, at 407.
112. See Britain, supra note 104, at 548.
113. See id.
114. The Brady Plan, named for U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas F. Brady, called
for reducing developing states' debt to commercial banks by 20 percent, combined with in-
creased lending from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. See GHATAK, supra
note 31, at 443-49; SALVATORE, supra note 11, at 355.
115. For example, U.S. banks reduced their loans to oil importing developing states from
$121 billion in 1982, when the debt crisis began, to $100 billion in 1986. See NAFZIGER, supra
note 31, at 470. See also Amuzegar, supra note 104, at 142.
116. See Garten, supra note 105, at 552-54.
117. See id. at 553. The 40 percent reduction figure is adjusted for inflation.
118. See John W. Sewell & Christine E. Contee, Foreign Aid and Gramm-Rudman, 65
FOREIGN AFF. 1015, 1022 (1987). It should be noted that total U.S. foreign assistance actually
increased during this period, but only because of the sharp increase in military assistance, which
more than offset the decrease in economic development assistance. See id.
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ents of strict macroeconomic structural adjustment policies that required
painful reductions of budget deficits and currency devaluations."9 Devel-
oping states that in the past might have equated foreign direct investment
with external control of their economy or neocolonialism'20 found that
foreign lending institutions could exercise far more control over their
economies than foreign direct investors. 2
These reductions in lending combined with capital flight sharply di-
minished the capital available to developing states to finance economic
development. 22 Unable to borrow sufficient funds and with their domestic
savings fleeing abroad, developing states found foreign direct investment
one of the few remaining sources of capital available.
The wisdom of turning to private direct investment to fuel economic
development seemed to be confirmed by yet another independent set of
events: the performance of several East Asian economies, specifically
Japan, the "Four Tigers" (Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore and
Taiwan) and three newly industrializing economies in Southeast Asia
(Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand)." 3 During the period from 1965 to
1990, these eight Asian economies grew at a rate that was three times the
rate in Latin America and twenty-five times the rate in sub-Saharan Af-
rica.'24 These eight economies were characterized by a number of
common features, prominently among them high rates of private invest-
ment and an emphasis on production for export. '2 The so-called East
Asian miracle amply demonstrated the role that private investment could
have in fueling rapid economic growth and seemed to indicate the benefits
of export led growth relative to import substitution industrialization.
2 6
119. See NAFZIGER, supra note 31, at 562-74. See also Jahangir Amuzegar, The IMF Un-
der Fire, 64 FOREIGN POL'Y 98 (1986).
120. On the critique of foreign investment as a form of neocolonialism, see GHATAK, su-
pra note 31, at 65; NAFZIGER, supra note 31, at 106-07; RAPLEY, supra note 8, at 18-20;
SORNARAJAH, supra note 38, at 43-45; TODARO, supra note 31, at 81-82; Viotti & Kauppi,
supra note 9, at 455-58; Jenkins, supra note 30, at 440-50.
121. See UNITED NATIONS TRANSNATIONAL COMPARATIONE AND MANAGEMENT
DIVISION, FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICIES 15
(1992).
122. Thus, the net inflow of private capital into developing countries in the 1980s was
only about 60 percent of what it had been in the late 1970s. See Eduardo Fernandez-Arias &
Peter J. Montiel, The Surge in Capital Inflows to Developing Countries: An Analytical Over-
view, 10 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 51, 51 (1996).
123. See Alex E. Fernndez Jilberto & Andrd Mommen, Setting the Neoliberal Develop-
ment Agenda, in LIBERALIZATION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 1, 3-4 (Alex E. Fernandez
Jilberto & Andrd Mommen eds., 1996) [hereinafter Jilberto & Mommen].
124. See WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC
POLICY 2 (1993).
125. See id. at 40-42; Jilberto & Mommen, supra note 123, at 15.
126. See Jilberto & Mommen, supra note 123, at 14; WORLD BANK, supra note 124, at
22-23, 37-38, 40-43.
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The final step in the emergence of the contemporary consensus was
the collapse of the Soviet bloc at the beginning of the current decade. So-
cialism with its planned economy had been the principal ideological
alternative to free market capitalism during the post-war era.'" The deci-
sion by virtually the entire socialist world to abandon planned economies
in favor of free markets delegitimated central planning and left free mar-
ket capitalism as seemingly the only effective model for economic
growth.1
2 8
The combined effect of these events was the emergence of a consen-
sus in the developing world about the desirability of attracting foreign
investment through free market policies.' 29 Developing states also realized
that attracting foreign investment would require them to compete for it.'
30
Even where developing states remained skeptical of the free market, the
structural adjustment policies required of them by international financial
institutions left many of them with no alternative but to liberalize their
economies. 
31
III. SUSTAINING THE LIBERAL CONSENSUS
As the foregoing suggests, the phenomenal shift toward liberalization
was largely driven by a perception that private investment would promote
economic development. Few if any developing states have embraced lib-
eralization as an end in itself. They are adherents to the liberal faith only
to the extent that the practice of their faith leads to economic salvation.
Economic development, of course, involves at least two elements: in-
creased productivity and an equitable distribution of wealth.' 32 Unless
liberalization delivers on both counts, then skepticism and ultimately
apostasy may not be far behind. Sustainable liberalism thus requires that a
liberal investment regime provide some measure of both growth and
equality.
127. See NAFZIGER, supra note 31, at 540-49; RAPLEY, supra note 8, at 70.
128. See RAPLEY, supra note 8, at 70; Mark Kramer, Eastern Europe Goes to Market, 86
FOREIGN POL'Y 134 (1992).
129. See RICHARD CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
249(2d ed. 1996); HANINK, supra note 63, at 234; Jilberto & Mommen, supra note 123, at 19-
20.
130. A 1985 study found intense competition among developing states to attract foreign
investment, with some states offering as many as thirty different incentives to attract a particular
investment. See CAVES, supra note 129, at 220.
131. See Jilberto & Mommen, supra note 123, at 5-8, 24.
132. See GHATAK, supra note 31, at 34, 242-43; TODARO, supra note 31, at 132.
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A. Maximizing Productivity
Liberal economic theory is based on the premise that free markets
will yield maximum productivity.' The underlying assumption, however,
is that markets are properly functioning. Unfortunately, developing states
are often characterized by extensive market failures.'
3
'
First, a developing state may lack the political and legal framework
necessary for the operation of the market.'35 Portions of the economy may
be nonmonetized, meaning that the price mechanism that is crucial to a
market allocation of resources will not even exist.36 Poor communication
may prevent potential investors from obtaining the information needed to
enter the market.3 7 Small markets such as those found in many develop-
ing states may be especially susceptible to restrictive business practices or
monopoly concentration."' The State may not have the resources to pro-
vide public goods, such as physical infrastructure, ' that the market will
not produce adequately.
If the market is to function properly, it may be necessary for the State
to intervene to correct potentially serious market failures. Sustainable lib-
eralism, then, first and foremost involves careful attention to market
failures.
133. Classical international trade theory holds that a State can maximize its productivity
by producing those goods in which it enjoys a comparative advantage and then trading with
other states to obtain goods in which those other states have a comparative advantage. A State
enjoys a comparative advantage in a good if the opportunity cost of producing that good is lower
than in another state. See SODERSTEN & REED, supra note 63, at 5-6. The theory of compara-
tive advantage is the cornerstone of international economics. See generally id. at 3-71; KENEN,
supra note 34, at 46-85.
134. See TODARO, supra note 31, at 87, 588-91. The discussion in the text is not exhaus-
tive. It is meant only to illustrate the range of potential problems that developing states face in
creating properly functioning markets.
135. This includes clearly established property and contract rights, as well as courts to en-
force these rights. See id. at 587.
136. Some areas of many developing countries still use a barter economy. See GHATAK,
supra note 31, at 33.
137. See TODARO, supra note 31, at 588-89.
138. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD) &
WORLD BANK, LIBERALIZING INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN SERVICES: A HANDBOOK
47(1994).
139. A public good is a benefit enjoyed by all persons simultaneously and the enjoyment
of which by one person is not diminished by that of another. Public goods represent a form of
market failure, since the general tendency is to refuse to contribute to production of the good in
the hope that one can take advantage of production by others. The result is that the market will
not provide an adequate quantity of the good. On the importance of infrastructure to develop-
ment, see HANINK, supra note 63, at 84; Jilberto & Mommen, supra note 123, at 11; TODARO,
supra note 31, at 589. On the importance of infrastructure to attracting foreign investment, see
UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, THE DETERMINANTS OF
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: A SURVEY OF THE EVIDENCE 24 (1992).
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The State, however, may lack the will necessary to facilitate the
proper functioning of the market. For example, politically motivated state
actors may pursue the goal of redistributing wealth, rather than facilitating
the operation of the market.' 4 Even where a political commitment to lib-
eralism exists, the public authorities may lack the information, skill or
resources needed to address deficiencies in the market.'1
4
If developed states wish to sustain the liberal consensus, they should
be prepared to assist developing states in creating. the conditions neces-
sary for a properly functioning market. This may entail, for example,
technical assistance with respect to the development of legal institutions,
economic assistance in building physical infrastructure and providing
other public goods, and assistance in kind with respect to the creation of
an information network. An international community that wishes to sus-
tain the liberal consensus may have little alternative but to ensure the
existence of the economic, legal and physical conditions necessary for the
success of a market based economy.
B. Producing an Appropriate Distribution
An even more vexing problem is the appropriate distribution of
wealth. The lesson of history is that prior attempts at liberalization often
have been undermined by popular resentment over the distributional con-
sequences of that liberalization.142 Sustainable liberalism thus requires that
a liberal investment regime produce a politically acceptable distribution of
wealth.
Liberal economics has relatively little to say on this issue: it is ad-
dressed principally to maximizing productivity rather than prescribing the
appropriate distribution of wealth.143 As it happens, the empirical evidence
shows that increased productivity in developing states in many cases has
been associated with a more equal distribution of wealth.' 44 Thus, a liberal
140. See RICHARD GRABOWSKI & MICHAEL P. SHIELDS, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
267, 273-76 (1996).
141. The Chicago school of economics in particular has developed a critique of govern-
ment intervention to cure market failures. See Warren J. Samuels, The Chicago School of
Political Economy: A Constructive Critique, in THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY 13 (Warren J. Samuels ed., 1993).
142. See Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link Between
Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1995). See generally
JACOB VINER, The Intellectual History of Laissez Faire, in ESSAYS ON THE INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY OF ECONOMICS 200, 222-25 (Douglas A. Irwin ed., 1991).
143. See RAPLEY, supra note 8, at 8; VINER, supra note 142, at 223-24.
144. The Kuznets curve hypothesizes that economic growth in developing states tends ini-
tially to aggravate inequality, but in later stages will diminish it. There are, however, a number of
examples, including Taiwan, South Korea, China, Costa Rica, Sri Lanka, and Hong Kong,
where rising income levels initially reduced inequality. See TODARO, supra note 31, at 154-55.
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investment regime that is successful in improving productivity may do
much to ensure its long term sustainability by enhancing equality as well.
C. The Inevitability of State Redistribution
At the same time, it would be naive in the extreme to expect devel-
oping states to adopt a pure liberal model. First, even those developed
states that most fervently espouse liberalism fall prey to political interest
groups that insist upon illiberal state interventions for the benefit of the
• 141
interest. groups. It is unrealistic to expect developing states, where cor-
ruption and clientism may be even greater problems than in developed
146
states, to escape similar pressures. Second, pressure to intervene will be
especially great if liberalization does not yield a politically acceptable
distribution of wealth. 147 Third, the East Asian states that have inspired the
third world with the possibility of economic development fueled by pri-
vate investment often utilized market regulation as part of their
development strategies,' a fact that is certain to be noted by developing
states seeking to emulate the East Asian success. Fourth, the extensive
state activity needed in some developing states to facilitate the operation
of the market will itself have distributional consequences that cannot be
ignored. State efforts to build physical infrastructure, for example, will
Indeed, East Asia generally has seen economic growth correlated with reductions in inequality.
See WORLD BANK, supra note 124, at 2-5, 29-32; Jilberto & Mommen, supra note 123, at 14;
Batara Simatupang, Economic Transformation and Liberalization in Indonesia, in Jilberto &
Mommen, supra note 123, at 51, 68-69. The evidence nevertheless remains mixed, with some
countries in fact experiencing the initial increase in inequality predicted by the Kuznets curve.
See TODARO, supra note 31, at 156-57. See also Alex E. Fernndez Jilberto & Barbara Hogen-
boom, Mexico's Integration in NAFTA: Neoliberal Restructuring and Changing Political
Alliances, in Jilberto & Mommen, supra note 123, at 138, 152; Carlos F Toranzo Roca, Bolivia:
Crisis, Structural Adjustment and Democracy, in Jilberto & Mommen, supra note 123, at 161,
175. On balance, however, it appears that there is a positive correlation between the rate of
growth and the share of the bottom 40 percent. See GHATAK, supra note 31, at 248. It is likely to
be the case, of course, that growth will benefit some sectors of the poor more than others. See id.
at 249-50.
145. See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States International In-
vestment Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT'L. L. 1 (1989).
146. See RAPLEY, supra note 8, at 43-44, 136-39; Ana Maria Fernandes, Neoliberalism
and Economic Uncertainty in Brazil, in Jilberto and Mommen, supra note 123, at 96, 118; Jil-
berto & Mommen, supra note 123, at 5, 25; Piet Konings, The Post-Colonial State and
Economic and Political Reforms in Cameroon, in Jilberto & Mommen, supra note 123, at 244,
245-49; Andr6 Mommen, Zaire's Economic Decline and Ill-Fated Liberalization Policies, in
Jilberto & Mommen, supra note 123, at 285, 298-300.
147. See supra text accompanying note 142.
148. See WORLD BANK, supra note 124, at 353-60; Stephen Haggard & Chung-in Moon,
The South Korean State in the International Economy: Liberal, Dependent or Mercantile?, in
Frieden & Lake, supra note 9, at 47-60; Jilberto & Mommen, supra note 123, at 24; Andrd
Mommen, The Asian Miracle: A Critical Reassessment, in Jilberto & Mommen, supra note 123,
at 28, 42-47.
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benefit some regions more than others, '49 some sectors of the economy
more than others5 ° and perhaps some racial or ethnic groups more than
others." ' Once the State is implicated in these redistributive activities,
even if they are intended only to promote efficiency, it will be difficult to
resist demands that the State engage in more overtly redistributive activi-
ties to benefit other regions, other sectors or other groups.
Each state intervention, however, with the exception of those that are
effective in curing market failures, potentially corrodes the efficiency
promised by liberalism.' The danger is that overregulation will stifle
productivity and destroy the effectiveness and the credibility of an osten-
sibly liberal but overregulated economy.
Developing a sustainable liberalism thus requires efforts to steer state
intervention in directions that will cause minimal distortion in the opera-
tion of the market. For example, states should avoid prohibitions on
foreign investment that merely protect inefficient domestic enterprises.
They should rely instead on subsidies or incentives if it is politically nec-
essary to assist local producers, since such an approach still permits
competition, albeit at a price disadvantage. "3 It also may be preferable to
direct subsidies or incentives toward industries that will produce for ex-
port, thereby expanding trade, rather than those that produce import
substitutes, which diminish trade and sacrifice economies of scale and
specialization.5 4 And because subsidies and incentives may encourage
inefficient behavior, redistribution of income may be better achieved
through a progressive tax system.5 The tax system, in turn, should be
calibrated so as not to discourage economic activity or undermine capital
formation through domestic saving.'56
Further, state intervention intended to create the conditions for an ef-
fective market, such as the construction of physical infrastructure, a
communications network and public schools,' 57 should be designed to en-
149. See Jilberto & Hogenboom, supra note 144, at 155.
150. See id. at 150-51.
151. See Chua, supra note 142.
152. See WORLD BANK, supra note 124, at 11.
153. See UNCTAD & WORLD BANK, supra note 138, at 54-58. Further, unlike prohibi-
tions on entry, subsidies makes the cost of assistance explicit.
154. See WORLD BANK, supra note 124, at 358-60.
155. See GHATAK, supra note 31, at 250-52; WORLD BANK, supra note 124, at 231.
156. See GHATAK, supra note 31, at 143.
157. In East Asia, for example, state investment in education was concentrated in primary
and secondary education, thus reaching a broad share of the population and reducing inequality.
See WORLD BANK, supra note 124, at 15-16, 160, 203.
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sure that the benefits are widely shared and do not exacerbate already ex-
isting inequalities.'
D. The Role of International Law
Although the BIT network is the principal legal manifestation of the
emerging liberal consensus, 59 BITs as currently formulated can play only
a modest role in the creation of a sustainable liberalism. BITs create a set
of legal rules for the protection of foreign investment that is essential to
the development of a liberal investment regime. Further, because the BITs
typically remain in force for a minimum period of ten years and then
continue indefinitely unless terminated by a party, they confer a limited
stability on those rules.'" BITs, however, do virtually nothing to address
market failures.'
BITs could be modified to make a greater contribution to the sustain-
ability of a liberal investment regime. First, they could assist in creating
the conditions for a properly functioning market. For example, they could
impose on host states obligations to protect investment more fully against
private infringement by requiring such states to provide certain minimum
158. See GHATAK, supra note 31, at 249-50. Development strategies in the past because of
their emphasis on industrialization too often have concentrated wealth creation in one or two
urban areas, neglecting rural development almost entirely. See TODARO, supra note 31, at 287.
159. See Vandevelde, supra note 1.
160. For example, the BIT between Moldova and the United States provides, in Article
XII, Paragraph 1, that the treaty "shall remain in force for a period of ten years and shall con-
tinue in force unless terminated in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article.' Treaty Between
the United States of America and the Republic of Moldova Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, art. XII, para. 1, reprinted in Investment Treaty with the
Republic of Moldova, Treaty Doc. 103-14, 103d Cong. 1st Sess., at 25 (1993). Article XII,
Paragraph 3 goes on to provide that "[wjith respect to investments made or acquired prior to the
date of termination of this Treaty and to which this Treaty otherwise applies, the provisions of
all of the other Articles of this Treaty shall thereafter continue to be effective for a further period
of ten years from such date of termination." Id. art. XII, para. 3, at 26.
161. A few BITs have transparency provisions, i.e. provisions intended to facilitate the
flow of information to investors about the investment climate in the host state. The most com-
mon provision requires each party to make public its laws concerning investment. For example,
the Moldova-United States BIT provides in Article II, Paragraph 8, that "[e]ach Party shall make
public all laws, regulations, administrative practices and procedures, and adjudicatory decisions
that pertain to or affect investments. Id. art. II, para. 8, at 10.
Another type of provision requires the host state to provide information directly to inves-
tors. For example, the BIT between the United States and the Ukraine was accompanied by an
exchange of letters in which the Ukraine agreed to designate an office to serve as "the coordi-
nator and problem solver for investors experiencing difficulties with registration, licensing,
access to utilities, regulatory and other matters." Exchange of Letters dated March 4, 1994,
reprinted in Treaty Between the United States of America and the Ukraine Concerning the En-
couragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, with Annex, and Related Exchange of
Letters, Treaty Doc. 103-37, 103d Cong. 2d Sess., at 15 (1994). Services to be provided by the
office include information on investment regulations and dissemination of information on in-
vestment projects and their sources of finance. Id.
Winter 1998]
Michigan Journal of International Law
protections for intellectual property 62 and to afford investors, with effec-
tive means of resolving investment related private disputes in local
courts."' Because of the number of BITs being negotiated by developed
states, it seems unlikely that developed states would be willing to agree to
the addition of many provisions obligating them to furnish significant
amounts of economic assistance for the purpose of creating a functioning
market. BITs nevertheless could include provisions calling for assistance
in kind. For example, they could include commitments by capital export-
ing states to assist capital importing states in disseminating information
about investment opportunities in the latter states or to provide technical
assistance to capital importing states in developing a more favorable in-
vestment climate.
Second, they could broaden support for a liberal investment regime
by extending their protections to domestic as well as foreign investment.'6
Domestic investors thus would enjoy the same right of access to foreign
currency and the same protection against state interference that foreign
investors enjoy, while having the same right to take investment disputes
with the host state government to international arbitration. Such a step
would assist in creating a domestic constituency in support of the liberal
regime created by the BITs.
A multilateral agreement on investment structured along similar lines
could make a far greater contribution to promoting a sustainable liberal-
ism.. Such an agreement could serve to universalize the legal framework
for a liberal investment regime in much the same way that the GATI' has
universalized liberal trade policy, thereby deepening the rhetorical and
legal commitment to liberal principles.
A multilateral agreement also could provide the most effective
mechanism for addressing market failures and for curbing excessive re-
distribution. State interventions to facilitate the market or to redistribute
wealth may be less subject to capture by domestic interests if performed
162. In general, stronger intellectual property protection attracts foreign investment. See
CAVES, supra note 129, at 50. The importance of intellectual property protection to attracting
foreign investment varies by the type of investment. It plays the greatest role in investments
involving research and development and the smallest role in investments involving sales and
distribution. See EDWIN MANSFIELD, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP., DISCUSSION PAPER
NO. 27, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 17 (1994). The strength of intellectual property protection may be
more important to the decision whether to transfer technology than to the decision whether to
invest. See id. at 19-20. Thus, intellectual property protection is particularly important to a host
state that seeks not simply capital investment, but new technology.
163. See GRABOWSKI & SHIELDS, supra note 140, at 269-70. See generally Frankel, su-
pra note 71, at 389; Rubin, supra note 71, at 1.
164. See Vandevelde, supra note 1.
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in accordance with international standards.'65 A multilateral agreement
could be accompanied by a set of codes addressing a range of problems,
such as environmental protection,166 restrictive business practices,67 and
tax policy.'
Standards that are the result of a multilateral negotiation may have a
greater political legitimacy than those proposed by a bilateral negotiating
partner. They may win more rapid acceptance on the ground that they
represent the international consensus, are the product of complex global
negotiation that cannot be reopened and thus are the only alternative to no
standards at all. Local political and economic interests would have less
influence over a multilateral standard setting process than a bilateral
treaty negotiation. Indeed, standards addressing market failures are un-
likely to emerge from bilateral agreements because of the desire to avoid
a patchwork of conflicting standards and because many states may be
unwilling to accept obligations that are not widely shared and thus would
place them at a competitive disadvantage within their region.
A multilateral agreement on investment nevertheless can play only a
limited role in promoting a sustainable liberalism. Many of the most seri-
ous forms of market failure, such as inadequacies in physical
infrastructure' 70 and education, 7' can be remedied only through the appli-
cation of substantial financial resources. Developing a sustainable
liberalism thus will entail a continuing role for international financial in-
stitutions in funding the development of the physical and human resources
necessary for the operation of the market.
165. See UNCTAD & WORLD BANK, supra note 138, at 42-44,47.
166. Environmental pollution is an example of a negative externality, which is a cost borne
by a person other than the one who produced it. Markets will oversupply a good that produces
negative externalities because the producer does not bear the full costs of the good and thus does
not have a sufficient disincentive to produce only the socially optimal amount. See NAFZIGER,
supra note 31, at 338-39.
167. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
168. Issues of tax policy include subsidies and incentives, which can distort the market by
encouraging producers to engage in inefficient behavior, but in some cases may be preferable to
the alternatives. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. In addition, because markets are
segmented along national boundaries, it may be necessary to harmonize tax policies to eliminate
market distortions caused by different national tax policies. See CAvEs, supra note 129, at 245-
46.
169. For example, environmental pollution constitutes an important type of market failure,
but a state may fear that environmental standards not adhered to by other states in the region will
deflect foreign investors to states that have less stringent standards.
170. See supra text accompanying note 138.
171. Education is an example of a positive externality, or benefit that is enjoyed by a per-
son who did not produce it. See GRABOWSKI & SHIELDS, supra note 140, at 195-200, 268.
Because the producers do not enjoy the full benefits of their activity, they have insufficient in-
centive to produce the socially optimal amount.
Winter 1998]
Michigan Journal of International Law
CONCLUSION
The liberal consensus that exists at the moment is unprecedented in
international political economy. The economic nationalist consensus that
dominated the international community in the early twentieth century was
destroyed by the protectionist trade wars of the 1930s.' The reemergence
of a new nationalist consensus in the post-war era has been prevented by
the failure of import substitution- industrialization policies to keep pace
with the results of export led growth policies .' The attempt by the so-
cialist and developing states to forge a new international economic order
was undermined by the economic stagnation of those states that most un-
ambiguously embraced socialism.174 The failures of nationalism and
Marxism coupled with the evident success of liberalism have created for
the first time in history an opening for the emergence of a liberal interna-
tional investment regime.
The liberal consensus, however, is a historically contingent one. Lib-
eralism is no less vulnerable than competing ideologies to the adverse
consequences of its failures. The past year, for example, has seen an eco-
nomic downturn in Southeast Asia, coupled with continuing economic
stagnation in Japan, leading already to claims that the East Asian miracle
is ending or that it never really existed. 7 Efforts to debunk this particular
miracle may well lead to a crisis of faith among recent converts to liber-
alism. States that favor a liberal investment regime thus must ensure that
the regime they build is sustainable-that it can endure beyond the unique
historical circumstances that gave birth to it.
Liberalism emerged at a particular moment in history in states that
could provide the necessary ingredients for the operation of free markets.
Many developing states, however, lack the conditions that permit markets
to function. If liberalism is to be sustainable, it must succeed. If it is to
succeed, then developed states must be prepared to assist developing
states to create the economic, legal and physical conditions required by a
properly functioning market.
172. See HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 35, at 2-3.
173. See Jilberto & Hogenboom, supra note 144, at 142-43; Jilberto & Monmen, supra
note 123, at 3-4, 19-20, 23.
174. See RAPLEY, supra note 8, at 45-46, 70.
175. See Harvey Stockwin, Miracle myth, political failures send some Asian economies
reeling, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 2, 1997, at G1; Ho Kwon Ping, Picking up the East
Asian Pieces, INT'L HERALD TRiB., Oct. 23, 1997, at 8; Stephen H. Dunphy, Economic Memo,
SEATrLE TIMES, Oct. 12, 1997, at D 1; Darren McDermott, Southeast Asian Banks Contribute to
a Bust in the Economic Boom, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1997, at 1; Merrill Goozner, Uncertain
Asian Economics Turn Inward, But Exports Say Long-Term Prospects Remain Sound, CHICAGO
TRIB., Sept. 22,1997.
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The existing network of BITs has contributed to the development of a
liberal investment regime, but its inattention to the problem of market
failures and its disregard of the need to develop a domestic political con-
stituency for liberalism have minimized the network's role in promoting
the long term sustainability of liberal investment policies. A multilateral
agreement that deepened the global consensus on liberalization of invest-
ment flows, that promoted a commitment to liberalism among domestic
investors in host states, and that provided a multilateral framework for
addressing market failures and curbing excessive redistributive programs,
although only part of the solution, would do much to ensure the long term
sustainability of a liberal investment regime.
